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Comment
The Political Offense Exception as Applicable to

Terrorists: Judicial Interpretation and Legislative
Reform
I.

INTRODUCTION

Generally, extradition may be defined as "the surrender by one
state at the request of another of a person who is accused, or has
been convicted of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of the
requesting state."' The practice of extradition had its origins in
the early non-western civilizations of the Egyptians, Chinese,
Chaldeans and Assyro-Babylonians 2 Today extradition is largely
governed by treaties between nations which set forth their obligations to surrender fugitive criminals, and normally extradition is
not permitted in the absence of a treaty or municipal law which
3
empowers a nation to do so.
The extradition practices of the United States are governed by
treaty. 4 In Valentine v. United States5 it was stated that no request for extradition will be honored unless the United States has
entered into a treaty with the requesting state. There have been,
however, isolated cases in which the United States has requested
1. G.V.
2. M.
(1974).

LA FORREST, EXTRADITION To AND FROM CANADA 1

CHERIF BASSIOUNI,

3. I. A. SHERER,

INTERNATIONAL

(1961).

EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1

EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

22 (1971).

4. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1984) (extradition law only continues in force while an extradition
treaty exists with a foreign government).
5. 299 U.S. 5 (1936).
6. Id. at 9-10. In describing this limitation on the power to extradite a person from the
United States the Court in Valentine stated:
It rests upon the fundamental consideration that the Constitution creates no executive prerogative to dispose of the liberty of the individual. Proceedings against him
must be authorized by law. There is no executive discretion to surrender him to a
foreign government, unless that discretion is granted by law. It necessarily follows
that as the legal authority does not exist save as it is given by act of Congress or by
the terms of a treaty, it is not enough that statute or treaty does not deny the power
to surrender. It must be found that statute or treaty confess the power.
Id. at 9.
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extradition of a criminal from foreign governments with whom no
extradition treaty is in force as an act of comity, but in such cases
the request has been accompanied by a statement that under the
laws of the United States reciprocity may not be granted.7 Extradition treaties entered into by the United States have the same force
and effect as an act of Congress and are binding on all courts. 8
While normally extradition treaties cover the most serious
crimes, there is in existence a doctrine by which political offenses
are excluded from the list of extraditable offenses contained in
such treaties.' This political offense exception has been generally
recognized as a "tenet" of international law. 10 This exception was
first seen in Belgium's extradition law of 1 October 1833 and began
to gain a wide following after 1834 when France excepted political
offenders from extradition under its treaties.1" Such an exception
was first seen in United States' extradition treaties in the midnineteenth century. 2 England has been slow in developing its extradition policy and did not even have an extradition statute until
1870.'1 However, the English Extradition Act of 187014 did contain
a provision for the exclusion from extradition of political offenders.
The first extradition treaty of the United States to expressly exclude political offenses was that with France in 1843."1 Extradition
law in the United States is set forth in chapter 209 of Title 18 of
the United States Codes where it is stated in section 3181 that:
"The provisions of this chapter relating to the surrender of persons
35 C.J.S. §24 at 452 (1960). See Vol. 4 MOORE INT'L L. DIG. §582 (1906).
35 C.J.S. §25 at 453 (1960).
9. G. V. LA FORREST, EXTRADITION To AND FROM CANADA 44 (1961). See Canadian Extradition Act, R.S.C., 1952, c. 322, s. 21 which provides that no fugitive is to be surrendered
for "an offense of a political character." R.S.C., 1952, c. 322, a. 21.
10. 11 R.L.C. §32 at 738 (1916). Toward the beginning of this century it was thought
that all crimes associated with the actual conflict of armed forces were of a political character, and thus beyond the reach of extradition. Id. See also S. 0. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 179 (1966), where it is stated: "Non-extradition for political
offenses is a generally recognized international principle." Id.
11. I. A. SHERER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 166-67 (1971).
12. Id. at 167.
13. G. V. LA FORREST, EXTRADITION To AND FROM CANADA 12 (1961).
14. 33 & 34 Vict., c. 52 (1870). It is stated in §3(I) of the Act that:
A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense in respect of which his
surrender is demanded is one of a political character, or if he proves to the satisfaction of the police magistrate or the court before when he is brought on habeas corpus,
or to the Secretary of State, that the requisition for his surrender has in fact been
made with a view to try or punish him for an offense of a political character.
7.
8.

Id.
15.
16.

I. A. SHERER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL
18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1984).

LAW

167-68 n.5 (1971).
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who have committed crimes in foreign countries shall continue in
force only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with
such foreign government.' 7 Currently, the United States is party
to ninety-six extradition treaties,18 each of which contains an exception from extradition for persons committing a political offense.'9 An example of the language which exempts political offenders from extradition used in extradition treaties of the United
States can be seen in the 1978 treaty between the United States
and Japan 20 where it is stated in Article IV of the treaty that:
1. Extradition shall not be granted under this Treaty in any of the following
circumstances:
(1) When the offense for which extradition is requested is a political offense
or when it appears that the request for extradition is made with a view to
prosecuting, trying or punishing the person sought for a political offense. If
any question arises as to the application of this provision, the decision of
the requested party shall prevail.2

Even though the political offense exception is a standard clause
in almost all extradition treaties and is also included in the municipal laws of many nations, the term political offense is almost
never defined in either treaties or laws.2 The determination of
what constitutes a political offense has been generally left for judicial interpretation.23 The result of such judicial determination is
that no uniformity exists among nations as to what exactly a political offense is under extradition treaties.2 4 Several approaches have
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1381 (1984).
18. A list of the 96 nations with which the United States has a bilateral extradition
treaty follows 18 U.S.C. §1381 (1984).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1984). Following a list of extraditable offenses it is stated that:
"No return or surrender shall be made of any person charged with the commission of any
offense of a political nature." Id. See also Thompson, The Evolution of the PoliticalOffense
Exception in an Age of Modern Political Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 315, 315 and
n.1 (1983).
20. TREATY ON EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN OF
MARCH 3, 1978, Art. IV, §1(1), T.I.A.S. 9625 (1980).
21. TREATY ON EXTRADITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN OF
MARCH 3, 1978, Art. IV, §1(1), T.I.A.S. 9625 (1980). This treaty entered into force on March

26, 1980.
22.

M.

CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

371

(1974).
23. Id.
24. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition
Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1226-27 (1962). Concerning the general nature of political offenses
it can be stated that: "Broadly speaking, a political offense is an act directed against the
security of the state." Id. at 1226. For a further discussion of the non-uniformity as to what
constitutes a political offense see OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 1, § 334 at 707-08
(H. Lauterpacht 8th Ed. 1952) where it is stated:
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developed in defining a political offense in specific cases. These approaches will be the subject of the following section of this comment. The overall aim of this comment will be to examine the operation of the political offense exception, especially in the United
States, in light of the increase in acts of transnational terrorism.
II.

APPROACHES TO INTERPRETING AND DEFINING THE POLITICAL

OFFENSE EXCEPTION

While no universal definition of a political offense has developed,
it appears that the courts in several nations have developed different approaches for determining whether an offense for which one is
sought to be extradited is in fact a political offense. Such a determination is extremely important because once an offense is labeled
by the court as political, no extradition may be made when the
governing treaty contains a clause invoking the political offense exception. It appears that four different approaches have developed
in determining what comprises a political offense in extradition
cases.2 5 This section will examine the Swiss, French and English
approaches, while the following section will examine the approach
utilized by courts in the United States and its ramifications in
light of the rise in acts of terrorism on a worldwide scale.
A.

The Swiss Approach

The Swiss approach to determining whether a particular offense
is political in nature has been termed the political motivation
test 2 6 This test examines the political motivation of the offender

/d.

[Wihereas many writers consider a crime 'political' if committed from a political motive, others call 'political' any crime committed for political purpose; again others
recognize such a crime only as 'political' as was committed both from a political motive and at the same time for a political purpose; and thirdly, some writers confine
the term 'political crime' to certain offenses against the state only, such as high treason, 'ese-majeste', and the like. Up to the present day all attempts to formulate a
satisfactory conception of the term have failed, and the reason of the thing will probably, for ever exclude the possibility of finding a satisfactory definition.

25. See generally Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem
of ExtraditionLaw, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1240-56 (1962); Thompson, The Evolution of the
Political Offense Exception in an Age of Modern Political Violence, 9 YALER J. WORLD Pua.
ORD. 315, 318-35 (1983); Gilbert, Terrorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 695, 697-702 (1985).
26. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition
Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1251 (1962). See also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADITION AND WORLD PUaLIC ORDER

402 (1974).
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by balancing the political and common elements of the crime.
Only if the political element of the crime is predominant over the
common element will the offender be spared from extradition. 28
The emphasis on the political motivation of one sought for extradition can be seen in the Swiss Extradition Law of 189229 which provides that:
[E]xtradition is not granted for political offenses. It is granted, however,
even when the guilty person alleges political motive or end, if the act for
which it has been requested constitutes primarily a common offense. The
Federal Tribunal decides liberally in each particular instance upon the
character of the infraction according to the facts of the case.Y'

As can be seen from the above quoted section of Swiss law, the
determination of whether an offense is political is to be made by
the Federal Tribunal of Switzerland.
In determining whether an offense is political, the Federal Tribunal has stated in the 1908 case of V. P. Wassilief 1 that three
general principles had to be satisfied.12 These three principles are:
(1) that the offense was committed for the purpose of helping or insuring
the success of a purely political purpose; (2) that there is a direct connection between the crime committed and the purpose pursued by a party to
modify the political or the social organization of the state; and (3) that the
political element predominates over the ordinary criminal element 23

Operation of these principles can be seen in the case of In re Ockert 34 in which an extradition request was made by the Prussian
Minister of Justice for the return of a member of the German Social-Democratic Party for the murder of a member of the National27. Gilbert, Terrorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34 IN'r'L &
Comp. L.Q. 695, 701 (1985).
28. Id. See also Thompson, The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception in an
Age of Modern Political Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 315, 320-21 (1983), where it is

stated that two conditions must be met for an offense to be deemed political under the
Swiss test: "First, the act for which extradition is sought must have been directly related to
furthering a goal of a political movement. Second, the 'predominance theory' requires that
the political element of an act be greater than the common crime element so that unnecessary injury or cruelty is avoided." Id.
29. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition
Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1251-52 (1962) (citing the Federal Extradition Law of January
22, 1982, Art. 10, HARVARD REsEARCH 423 (Swit.)(Unofficial translation)).
30. Id.
31.
32.

[1909] U.S. FOREIGN REL. 519 (1914).
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION

03 (1974).
33. Id. at 403.
34. [1933-34] Ann. Dig. 369 (No. 157)(Swit.).

AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER

402-
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Socialist Party. Ockert, the party sought for extradition, claimed
that he should not be extradited on the grounds that his was a
political offense." The Federal Tribunal upheld Ockert's objection
to his extradition based on the Tribunal's finding that Ockert's actions were political because such clashes were part of a wide scale
struggle akin to a civil war.36
The case In re Peruzzos7 was factually similar to Ockert; however, the Federal Tribunal reached the opposite result. In Peruzzo,
Italy sought extradition of one accused of "incitement to, or complicity in," the homicide of a fascist." A claim was made that the
offense was of a political nature, but the Tribunal held that extradition had to be granted on the grounds that there was an insufficient relation between the political end sought and the crime
committed. 9
Another case involving the allowance of extradition was In re
Nappi.4 0 In Nappi a member of a neo-fascist group was sought to
be extradited to Italy for armed robbery and even though the Tribunal found that a political motive existed, it went on to hold that
the common element of the crime predominated over the political
element and thus it was not a political offense.'
35. Id. at 369-70.
36. Id. at 370-71. The Tribunal further reasoned that:
It is not necessary that the act should be closely connected with a political crime...
'The right to refuse extradition' applies more . . . to so called relatively political offences in the wider sense-namely, acts which have the character of an ordinary
crime appearing in the list of extraditable offences but which, . . . because of the
motive and the object, are of a predominately political complexion.
Id. at 370.
37. [1952] Int'l L. Rep. 369 (1951)(No. 79)(Swit.).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 370-71. In holding that extradition should be granted in this case the Tribunal stated:
(a) In December 1945 the war in Italy was over; hostilities had ended in the spring,
when American forces occupied Italian territory. Italy had a Government of national
unity, comprising all parties (even the Communist), which effectively exercised its
authority over the whole of Italian territory. It does not appear that in such conditions a struggle for power could break out and the fascist movement reconquer power.
(b) Even if it is admitted that there were still remnants of a political struggle, and
that the political purpose in this case was to prevent a return of the fascist regime or
the constitution of a fascist opposition to . . . the new Government, it cannot be
admitted that the relation between the end sought and the homicide of Lorenzo Cappello was sufficient to make it possible for that homicide to be described as political.
Id.
40. [1952] Int'l L. Rep. 375 (No. 81) (Swit.).
41. Id. at 375-76. In describing the operation of the political motivation test to the
facts of this case the Tribunal stated:
So far as the crime of robbery is concerned. . .the accused contends that he did not
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In re Kaphengst 2 is said to be the leading Swiss case under the
political motivation test involving acts of terrorism.4 3 In
Kaphengst, the party sought for extradition had been involved in
the planting of several bombs throughout Germany and had fled to
Switzerland where he resisted extradition by claiming that his offenses were political in character." The Swiss Federal Tribunal rejected the political offense claim and extradition was granted. 45
The Tribunal's decision was based on its finding that the common
element of the crime predominated over the political element .4
The Tribunal, in describing what would give a common crime a
predominantly political character, stated:
For a common delict to be classed as a predominantly political offense it is
not enough that it has a political motive and object or that it is capable of
The practice of courts has always
realising or furthering that object ....
required a certain relationship between the objective and the means selected for its realisation; a relationship of such a nature that the idealistic
motives connected with the objective were strong enough to let the injury47or
threat to private rights appear, if not as justified, at least as excusable.

After applying the above quoted analysis, the Tribunal concluded
that the bombings in Kaphengst could not be regarded as a means
justified by the political object of the crime and that the danger
created to innocent persons caused the common element of the
crime to predominate.4 8
act in his personal interest, but in that of the political 'Group R' to which he belonged, and that his offence was thus political in character...
Since robbery is a common offence, the objection raised by the accused amounts to
saying that, in the circumstances of the case, it is a relative political offence, i.e., an
offence which, while having the characteristics of a common crime, acquired political
character by virtue of the motive inspiring it, the purpose for which or the circumstances in which it was committed; in other words, it is a common offence with a
predominantly political character...
[T]he political character of an offence is predominant only if the offence is in direct
relation to the end sought. In order that such a relation may exist, this offence must
be a really efficacious method of achieving the end, or constitute an integral part of
acts leading thereto, or represent an incident in a general political movement in
which the parties have recourse to such methods.
Id.
42. 11929-30] Ann. Dig. 292 (1930) (No. 188) (Swit.).
43. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition
Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1253 (1962).
44.' [1929-30] Ann. Dig. 292 (1930) (No. 188) (Swit.).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 292-93.
47. Id. at 293.
48. Id. The Tribunal further elaborated:
The accused resisted extradition on the ground that this was a case of a political
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Another Swiss case involving an act of terrorism is In re Kavic.49
Here a group of Yugoslavian nationals hijacked a Yugoslav passenger plane, of which they were crew members, and demanded that it
be flown to Switzerland where they sought political asylum.50 In
Kavic, the Federal Tribunal denied extradition finding that the
purpose motivating the act was fleeing from a totalitarian regime
in an effort to obtain political freedom.5 1 In finding that this hijacking was a political offense, the Tribunal noted that the offenses
against the other crew members were slight and that no other
means was available for the hijackers to achieve their goal of political freedom.5 1 Achieving their objectives with minimal danger to
others distinguished Kavic from Kaphengst, where the Tribunal
found that planting bombs presented a significant danger to innocent persons not necessary to achieve the alleged political
offense. He urged that the bomb outrages were committed in order to further the
ends of the 'Country People Movement' (Landvolk-bewegung) which aimed, in the
first place, at a change of the law of taxation said to be unbearable for the peasants
and rural middle class, and, in the second place, at an amendment of the SocialDemocratic Constitution of Weimar on nationalistic lines.
Id.
To these political goals which the accused claimed motivated his actions, the Tribunal
responded:
Bomb outrages of the kind perpetrated in the present case in the struggle for
amending the fiscal legislation cannot, according to Swiss conceptions, be regarded as
means justified, in the above sense, by the object of the crime. Fhe danger to innocent persons brought about by the bomb outrages caused the common element of the
delicts mentioned in the warrant of arrest to become predominant so as to prevail
completely over the political aspect of the act.
Id. at 292-93.
49. [1952] Int'l L. Rep. 371 (No. 80) (Swit.).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 373-74. In describing how the crime of hijacking could be a predominantly
political offense the Tribunal stated:
(b) The purpose and motive of the acts with which the accused are charged was to
enable them to flee from a country with whose regime they were not in agreement
and where they felt themselves to be watched and repressed. . . . This fact gives
both the flight and the offences committed to make it possible a distinctly political
colouring...
In this connection there can also be applied the principle that the relation between
the purpose and the means adopted for its achievement must be such that the ideals
connected with the purpose are sufficiently strong to excuse, if not justify, the injury
to private property, and to make the offender appear worthy of asylum. Freedom
from the constraint of a totalitarian state must be regarded as an ideal in this sense.
In the present case the required relationship undoubtedly exists; for, on the one
hand, the offences against the other members of the crew were not very serious, and
on the other, the political freedom and even existence of the accused was at stake,
and could only be achieved through the commission of these offences.
Id. (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 374.
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objectives.
An examination of the decisions of the Swiss Federal Tribunal
seems to indicate that the more violent a crime is, the more closely
it must be connected to a political goal. Usually, in cases involving
violence, the political goal would seem to have to be some kind of
political struggle for power, such as the struggle between the Social-Democratic and National-Socialist parties in Germany as was
present in In re Ockert.5 8 On the other hand, where the Tribunal
finds that innocent persons were not placed in extreme danger,
such as in In re Kavic,5 4 a determination that an offense is political

is more likely. Some commentators would argue, however, that this
distinction in results is more accurately justified under the Swiss
approach as being a tool of foreign policy rather than a judicial
standard for balancing interests.5 6 Whether this is true or not, the
Swiss Federal Tribunal will look at the political motivation of the
offender in conjunction with a careful analysis of the circumstances
existing in the state where the offense has been committed to determine if extradition is warranted. This approach has been said to
be the most developed of the four and is also widely accepted by
academic writers. 6 The Swiss approach has also been followed by
other nations such as Germany, Belgium, Argentina, Brazil, Chile
s
and Italy.
B.

The French Approach

The approach which French courts have taken in determining
whether an offense is political in nature has been called the objective test,58 which is said to direct the "inquiry to the character of
the target of an act for which extradition is sought. 5' 9 The adop-

tion of this approach finds its origins in France's extradition law
53. [1933-34] Ann. Dig. 369 (No. 157) (Swit.). See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
54. [1952] Int'l L. Rep. 371 (No. 80) (Swit.). See supra notes 48-50.
55. Thompson, The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception in an Age of Modern
Political Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 315, 322 (1983). See also Gilbert, Terrorism
and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34 INrr'L & COMP. L.Q. 695, 695-96
(1985).
56. Gilbert, Terrorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34 INr'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 695, 701 (1985).
57. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition
Law, 48 VA. L. Rav. 1226, 1255-56 (1962).
58. Id. at 1249. See also Thompson, The Evolution of the PoliticalOffense Exception
in an Age of Modern Political Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PU. ORD. 315, 332 (1983).
59. Thompson, The Evolution of the PoliticalOffense Exception in an Age of Modern
Political Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PuB. ORD. 315, 332 (1983).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 25:481

which provides:
Art. 5 Extradition is not granted: . . .
2. When the crime or offense has a political character or when it is clear
(results) from the circumstances that the extradition is requested for a political end.
As to acts committed in the course of an insurrection or a civil war by one
or the other of the parties engaged in the conflict and in the furtherance
(dans l'int~rft) of its purpose, they may not be grounds for extradition unless they constitute acts of odious barbarism and vandalism prohibited by
the laws of war, and only when the civil war has ended.60

The leading case in French law setting forth the objective test is In
re Giovanni Gatti,61 in which the Republic of San Marino sought
the extradition of one convicted for the attempted homicide of a
member of a communist cell. 62 A claim that the crime was political
in nature was made, to which the French court responded that extradition should be granted on the condition that the political motive of the act would not aggravate the offense, and "that the person extradited would not be tried by an extraordinary tribunal." 3
More importantly the court in Gatti set forth a very rigid standard
by which to determine whether an offense was political. Basically,
an offense is political if it is one that only affects the political organization of the state, while a common crime affects rights other
than those of the state."
60. French Extradition Law of March 10, 1927, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 380, 380-81 (1935)
(unofficial translation). See also Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty
Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1249 (1962).
61. [1947] Ann. Dig. 145 (No. 70) (Fr.).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 145.
64. Id. This standard was more fully set forth by the court as such:
Political offenses are those which injure the political organism, which are directed
against the constitution of the government and against sovereignty, which trouble the
order established by the fundamental laws of the state and disturb the distribution of
powers. Acts which aim at overthrowing or modifying the organization of the main
organs of the state, or at destroying, weakening or bringing into disrepute one of
these authorities, or at exercising illegitimate pressure on the play of their mechanism
or on their general direction of the state, or which aim at changing the social conditions created for individuals by the constitution in one or all its elements, are also
political offenses. In brief, what distinguishes the political crime from the common
crime is the fact that the former only affects the political organizations of the state,
the proper rights of the state, while the latter exclusively affects rights other than
those of the state.
Id. See also In re Colman, [19471 Ann. Dig. 139 (No. 67) (Fr.). In this case the French court
extradited a Belgium citizen charged with collaborating with the enemy, carrying arms
against Belgium and assassination. Id. The French court determined that the crimes involved were common in nature, despite the fact that treason is usually treated as a political
offense. Id. In reaching this decision, the court stated:

1987

Political Offense Exception

It has been claimed that Gatti contradicts the legislative intent
behind France's extradition statute, in that the statute calls for an
examination of the surrounding circumstances as well as the actor's subjective motivation." Soon after the decision in Gatti, however, the French courts began to become disenchanted with the objective test and began to look at the political character of crimes as
compared to their common element.60 This post-Gatti French approach has looked at the circumstances in which an offense was
committed as well as considering the offender's motivation. It has
been stated that the French courts had adopted a new test which
was very similar to the Swiss approach in its reliance on the predominance of the political character of a crime over the common
67
element.

Beginning in the 1970's, French courts have been faced with extradition cases concerning modern political terrorism.68 In the 1977
case Klaus Croissant,9 an extradition request by West Germany
was granted by a French court for the return of the former attorney of the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group on the charge of passing
information between imprisoned and at-large members of the
group.70 The grounds for allowing this extradition was that the
crime was a common one. 7 1 Finally, in the Pipeino72 case the
Furthermore, in time of war, in a country occupied by the enemy, collaboration with
the latter excludes the idea of a criminal action against the political organization of
the state which characterizes the political offense. It cannot be objected that France
has no interest in surrendering an offender to Belgium on a charge of intelligence
with the enemy of that country.

119471 Ann. Dig. 137, 139-41 (No. 67)(Fr.).
65. Thompson, The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception in an Age of Modern
Political Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 315, 333 (1983).
66. See Carbonneau, Terrorist Acts-Crimes or Political Infraction? An Appraisal of
Recent French Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 265, 277 (1980).
67. Id. For a full discussion of the line of French cases departing from the objective
approach see id. at 277-81.
68. Thompson, The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception in an Age of Modern
Political Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 315, 334 (1983). The first notable case dealing with modern terrorism was In re Abu Daoud, 104 Journal de Droit International 843
(1977), in which extradition was denied on grounds other than the political offense exception. Id.
69. For a discussion of this unreported case see Thompson, The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception in an Age of Modern Political Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB.
ORD. 315, 334-35 (1983).
70. See id.
71. Id. See also Carbonnneau, Terrorist Acts-Crimes or Political Infraction?An Appraisalof Recent French Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 265, 287-90
(1980).
72. For a discussion of this case see Carbonneau, Terrorist Acts-Crimes or Political
Infraction?An Appraisal of Recent French Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
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French courts seemingly have moved to a position which would allow extradition in almost all cases involving terrorist acts. Pipeino
involved Italy's extradition request of an alleged participant in the
kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro.73 In determining that such a
crime was not a political offense, the French court, while setting
forth no specific test, seemed to rely on the Swiss test, which looks
at whether the common element predominates, by indicating that
7
such a grave crime was menacing toward society. '
C.

The English Approach

The British Extradition Act of 1870 contains an exemption for
the extradition of persons charged with an offense of a political
character.7 5 However, there is no definition of political offense in
the Act. This has been left to the courts. The initial determination
of the meaning of political offense was made in the landmark case
of In re Castioni.7 6 The test set forth in Castioni for determining
what a political offense is has been termed the incidence test.7 In
Castioni, the Swiss government was seeking extradition of a man
accused of murdering a government official during an uprising at
the municipal palace.7 8 The prisoner claimed before the English
magistrate that he should not be extradited because his was a political offense.7 9 The court, in deciding that no extradition should
be granted in this case, held that the term political offense was to
be interpreted as an act that was incidental to and forming a part
of a political disturbance.80
Three years following the Castioni decision, an English court
was faced with a request by France for extradition of an anarchist
who stood accused of the bombings of a cafe and a military barracks. 1 The accused claimed that the bombing of a military barREV. 265, 291-96 (1980).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 33 & 34 Vict., c. 52 (1870). For the relevant text of this act see supra note 14.
76. [18911 1 Q.B. 149.
77. See Garcia-Mora, The Nature of PoliticalOffenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1246 (1962); Thompson, The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception in an Age of Modern Political Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 315,
318 (1983). See also Cantrell, The Political Offense Exemption in InternationalExtradition: A Comparison of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60
MARQ. L. REV. 777, 784-97 (1977).
78. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, 151.
79. Id. at 151, 152.
80. Id. at 153.
81. In re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415.
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racks was a political offense.82 The court, in In re Meunier,83 held
that this was not a political offense on the grounds that in order.
for there to be a political offense "there must be two or more parties in the State, each seeking to impose the Government of their
own choice on the other" and the offense must be committed by
one side against the other in pursuit of that object.84 Looking at
the Castioni test in light of the decision in the Meunier case, it
would appear that Meunier emphasized the requirement in Castioni that the offense be a part of a political disturbance. It has
also been asserted that the decision in Meunier was "the first judicial rejection of anarchism or terrorism as a legitimate international political method of protest."8 5
In 1955, in Ex parte Kolczynski, 86 Poland requested extradition
of seven members of a Polish fishing trawler who forcibly seized
the vessel in order to seek political asylum in England. Evidence
at a magistrate's hearing showed that the vessel's political officer
had been recording the seven crew members' conversations with a
view toward prosecuting them for their political opinions upon
their return to Poland.88 The court purported to follow the Castioni incidence test, but also added the requirement that a political
offense "must always be considered according to the circumstances
existing at the time when they have to be considered." 89 The decision reached in Kolczynski was that the crew members had committed a political offense and therefore could not be extradited
82. Id. at 416.
83. [18941 2 Q.B. 415.
84. Id. at 419.
85. Cantrell, The Political Offense Exemption in InternationalExtradition: A Comparison of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L. REv.
777, 786 (1977). Cf. Thompson, The Evolution of the Political Offense Exception in an Age
of Modern Political Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 315, 319 (1983). In discussing the
effect of Meunier on the Castioni test it was stated:
Justice Cave rejected Meunier's assertion and declared that the incidence test requires the existence [of] a political uprising in which two or more factions vie for
control of the government. Accordingly, random violence of the type used by an anarchist could never constitute a political offense since it does not further the interests
of a faction.
Together, Castioni and Meunier delimit the political offense exception where violence
has been committed with a political purpose.
Thompson, The Evolution of the PoliticalOffense Exception in an Age of Modern Political
Violence, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 315, 319 (1983).
86. [1955] 1 Q.B. 540.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 550.
89. Id. at 549.
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back to Poland.90 In reaching this decision, the court seemed to
have ignored the requirement set forth in Meunier that there must
be two or more factions vying for control of the government in order for there to be a political offense. Perhaps this is best explained by the court's discussion of the nature of totalitarian states
and the fact that the revolt of the seven crew members was the
only means available to them to obtain political asylum. 1
In Ex parte Schtraks,92 an English court was given the task of
evaluating an extradition request made by Israel for the return of a
grandfather who had been charged with child stealing and perjury
when he refused to return a child to his parents.9 3 The reason
given for the grandfather's refusal to return the child was that he
feared the child's parents would not educate the child as an orthodox Jew. 4 The court held that this was not a political offense after
a long analysis of prior case law dating back to Castioni.9 5 Speaking for the court Lord Radcliffe stated that the idea behind a political offense "is that the fugitive is at odds with the State that applies for his extradition on some issue connected with the political
control or government of the country."9 0 Lord Radcliffe also stated,
in reference to the Kolczynski case, that the idea of a political offense was akin to political asylum.

7

Finally, in describing what he

believed the judges in Castioni and Meunier were trying to express, Lord Radcliffe stated:
The analogy of 'political' in this context is with 'political' in such phrases as

90. Id. at 546-47.
91. Id. at 549. Perhaps the divergence from the requirements of In re Meunier is best
explained by the statement of the Kolczynski court that:
The words 'offense of a political character' must always be considered according to
the circumstances existing at the time when they have to be considered. The present
time is very different from 1891, when Castioni's case was decided. It was not then
treason for a citizen to leave his country and start a fresh life in another. Countries
were not regarded as enemy countries when no war was in progress. Now a state of
totalitarianism prevails in some parts of the world and it is a crime for citizens in
such places to take steps to leave. In this case the members of the crew of a small
trawler engaged in fishing were under political supervision and they revolted by the
only means open to them. They committed an offense of a political character, and if
they were surrendered there could be no doubt that, while they would be tried for the
particular offense mentioned, they would be punished as for a political crime.
Id.
92. [1964] A.C. 556.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 557.
95. Id. at 585.
96. Id. at 591.
97. Id.
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'political refugee,' 'political asylum' or 'political prisoner.' It does indicate, I
think, that the requesting State is after him for reasons other than the enforcement of the criminal law in its ordinary, what I may call its common or
international, aspect. 98

Lord Radcliffe then concluded that the offenses charged against
the appellant in the Schtraks case did not come within the conception of political offenses. 99
A further requirement was added to the English courts' interpretation of the political offense exception in Ex parte Cheng.10 0 In
Cheng, the United States sought extradition of a member of a
Formosan group opposed to the government of Taiwan for the attempted murder of Taiwan's vice-premier in New York.10 1 The
court in Cheng relied principally on the reasoning in Ex parte Schtraks,102 and thus concluded that the United States had no concern
other than enforcing its criminal laws since the crime was an action
against the United States government.1 0 3 Thus, after the decision
in Cheng, it would appear that in order for a crime to come within
the political offense exception it would have to be directed at the
state that is requesting the extradition.'"
It has been stated that as a result of the judicial modifications of
the incidence test since Castioni was decided, terrorism has been
98. Id.
99. Id. at 592.
100.

[1973] A.C. 931.

101.

Id.

102.
103.

[1964] A.C. 556, 591. See supra text accompanying note 96.
[1973] A.C. 931, 942-43.

104. Id. See also Cantrell, The Political Offense Exemption in InternationalExtradition: A Comparison of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60
MARQ. L. REv. 777, 789 (1977). Here there is a discussion of precepts that can be drawn from
English case law in an attempt to construct a permanent definition of a political offense,
which is stated as such:
(1) There must exist a close connection between the crime committed and the political motivation of the actor (Schtraks).
(2) The political object sought to be achieved is a limited and specific one, and not
one of terroristic qualities (Meunier).
(3) The crime must take place in the course of a political struggle (Castioni), unless a
political struggle is, as a practical matter, not feasible under a totalitarian government. Cases involving a totalitarian government will be examined in the light of a
liberal humanitarian policy toward the offender (Kolczynski).
(4) The act, even if arising during a political controversy in the state, must be committed with the goal of furthering the movement and not committed for personal or
selfish motivations (Schtracks).
(5) The political crime must be directed at the state requesting extradition (Cheng).
Cantrell, The Political Offense Exemption in InternationalExtradition:A Comparison of
the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 777, 789
(1977).
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effectively excluded from coming under the political offense exception. 105 Whether or not this is true, it would appear that under
English law the offense is considered more important than the motivation of the offender.106 It also would seem clear that the political disturbance in question must be directly against the government of the requesting state. 107 The lone area where an exception
has been carved out applies to those offenders who are seeking to
escape from totalitarian states. 10 8 In light of the case law laid down
since the test was established in the 1891 Castioni decision, the
most persistent criticism of the English approach has been that the
decisions are politically motivated. 0 9 More specifically, such criticism is centered on the argument that British interpretation of the
political offense exception is designed to protect western liberal democracies." 0 This criticism notwithstanding, there has been little
indication if any in England that the incidence approach will be
subject to any sweeping changes in the near future."'

III. THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION IN THE

UNITED STATES

The method of determining what constitutes a political offense
2
in American law can be traced back to the 1894 case In re Ezeta."
It has been said that the American courts adopted the incidence
test from the English case In re Castioni,"3 but, unlike the English
courts, American courts have been unwilling to consider the motivation either of the offender or of the country seeking extradition."' Therefore, the American approach is considered to be a
narrow interpretation of the English incidence test." 5 In the Ezeta
case, the Republic of Salvador sought extradition of its former
president and some of his military officers on charges of murder,
arson, robbery and rape in connection with their activities in opposing the revolutionary forces which eventually overthrew
105. Gilbert, Terrorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised, 34
COMP. L.Q. 695, 698 (1985).
106. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Gilbert, Terorism and the Political Offense Exemption Reappraised,34
COMp. L.Q. 695, 698 (1985).

INT'L

&

INT'L

&

110. Id.
111. Id. at 697-98.
112. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
113. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149. See notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
114. Lubet and Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of
Political Terrorists,71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 203 (1980).
115. Id.
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them." 6 In addressing the question of the political offense exception, the court first held that the committing magistrate, and thus
the judiciary, has jurisdiction over, and the duty to determine,
whether an offense is of a political nature and not subject to extradition.117 The court then went on to hold that the offenses in question were political in that they were "closely identified with the
acts of a political uprising,"1 18 and "were all committed during the
progress of actual hostilities between the contending forces."" 9
Two years after Ezeta, the United States Supreme Court took
up the issue of what constitutes a political offense in Ornelas v.
Ruiz.'20 In Ornelas, Mexico sought the extradition of three Mexican citizens who had passed from Texas into Mexico and participated in a raid on both Mexican soldiers and civilians. 12 ' Among
the charges against the accused were murder, arson, robbery and
kidnapping.' 2 2 The Supreme Court held that these offenses were
not political in nature after taking into account "the character of
the foray, the mode of attack, the persons killed or captured, and
the kind of property taken or destroyed.' ' 23 In light of both the
Ezeta and Ornelas cases, a political offense has been defined as
"an act committed in the course of and incidental to a violent po24
litical disturbance such as war, revolution, or rebellion.'
At least one federal district court made a distinction concerning
the jurisdiction of the courts to determine what constitutes a political offense. In In re Lincoln,'2 5 Great Britain sought the extradition of a man accused of forgery and obtaining money on false pretenses.128 The accused claimed that the criminal charges against
him were not brought until after he had made certain political
statements while in the United States, and therefore, his extradition was sought for political reasons. 2 7 The court went on to hold
that, even though it was the function of the court to determine
whether the offense was political or criminal, it was not for the
116. 62 F. 972, 976-79 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
117. Id. at 995-97.
118. Id. at 1002.
119. Id. at 997.
120. 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
121. Id. at 510-11.
122. Id. at 510.
123. Id. at 511.
124. Annot., 61 A.L.R. FED. 786, 788 (1983). See also In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 998 (N.D.
Cal. 1894).
125. 228 F. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1915).
126. Id. at 71.
127. Id. at 73-74.
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court to "exercise discretion as to whether the criminal charge is a
cloak for political action, nor whether the request is made in good
faith. ' 128 These latter determinations are to be left to the State

Department. 129
American courts have taken the view that the determination as
to whether an offense is political should not be affected by the motives of the government requesting extradition. 3 0 In Ramos v.
Diaz,'-" the Republic of Cuba sought the extradition of two former
participants in Castro's revolutionary movement who had been
128. Id. at 74. Specifically the court in Lincoln stated:
The court is concerned solely with the question of the charge of crime, and that
crime, as has been said, must be one known as a crime in the place where the hearing
was held. If it be shown that the acts charged as crime indicate a political offense,
and not a criminal one, as known to the jurisdiction holding the hearing, then certainly the court could not find that there was probable cause as to the commission of
the crime. This would involve considering whether the offense as charged is political
or criminal.
But is it not a part of the court proceedings nor of the hearing upon the charge of
crime to exercise discretion as to whether the criminal charge is a cloak for political
action, nor whether the request is made in good faith. Such matters should be left to
the Department of State ...
It is thought by the court that application to the Secretary of State of the United
States will furnish full protection against the delivery of the accused to any government which will not live up to its treaty obligations, and that the Secretary of State
will be fully satisfied (before delivering the accused to the demanding government)
that he is wanted (in the legal sense of the term) upon a criminal charge, that it is not
sought to secure him from a country upon which he is depending as an asylum because of political matters, and that the treaty is not actually used as a subterfuge.
Id.
129. Id. For a further discussion of the procedural aspects of extradition concerning
the political offense exception see Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism: The
Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 617, 618 n. 4 (1981), where it is stated:
Procedurally, the determination of a political offense in the United States is a twostep process. First, a court must determine whether the offense is extraditable under
the treaty, according to law and evidence. To do this the court must decide whether
the offense is political (if the provisions of the extradition treaty do not apply to
offenses of a political character), because the jurisdiction of the committing judgment
or magistrate is terminated when the political nature of the offense is established. 'In
other words, he [then] has no authority to certify such a case to the executive department for any action whatever.' Once the court decides that the extradition is warranted, the second step permits the State Department to exercise executive discretion
and in effect to veto the extradition. However, the State Department does not have
jurisdiction to grant an extradition request after it has ben denied by the judiciary.
Furthermore, the judiciary is not to consider whether an extradition request is made
in good faith or merely as a cloak for political action:
Such matters should be left to the Department of State.
Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism: The Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 617, 618 n. 4 (1981) (citations omitted).
130. Annot., 61 A.L.R. FED. 786, 789 (1983).
131. 179 F. Supp 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
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convicted of the murder of a prisoner. 132 The court, in holding the
offense in question to be political, noted that the murder had been
committed at a time of great turmoil when the victorious Castro
forces were still engaged in fighting with remnants of the Batista
regime. 133 The Ramos court further explained that the determination as to whether an offense was political should be made by considering "the circumstances attending the crime at the time of its
commission" and not the motives of the requesting government in
demanding the extradition.'s
It seems clear that the incidence test has survived almost unchanged in American law since it was first announced in In re
Ezeta3 s back in 1894. The United States Court of Appeals for the
36
Fifth Circuit stated in the 1980 case Escobedo v. United States"
that the definition of a political offense was "an offense committed
in the course of and incidental to a violent political disturbance
such as war, revolution and rebellion."'13 7 The court further stated
that "an offense was not of a political character simply because it
was politically motivated."'' 38 Despite the fact that the test has remained relatively the same, it has now become necessary to apply
the test to a new type of crime, that being international terrorism.
In 1981, an extremely important decision was handed down by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concerning the political offense exception and acts of international terrorism. 39 In Eain v. Wilkes,140 the Seventh Circuit reviewed the
decision of a magistrate in the Northern District of Illinois permit132. Id.
133. Id. at 463.
134. Id. See also Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (1971), where
the court in following Ramos states:
A political offense under the extradition treaties, must involve an 'uprising' or some
other violent political disturbance. Moreover, the act in question must have been incidental to the occurrence in order to justify the exclusion. The status of the offense
committed, whether a political offense or not, is to be determined by the circumstances attending the alleged crime at the time of its commission and not by the
motives of those who subsequently handle the prosecution.
450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (1971) (citation omitted).
135. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894). See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
136. 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980).
137. Id. at 1104.
138. Id. See also United States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovich, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.
Cal. 1959); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962); In re Gonzalez, 217 F.
Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); and Garcia-Guillein v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir.
1971).
139. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
140. Id.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 25:481

ting the extradition to Israel of an alleged participant in the bombing of a market place which resulted in two deaths and numerous
injuries.14 ' The United States district court denied the accused's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and affirmed the magistrate's
decision, holding that the bombing was not incidental to the conflict in Israel.1 4 ' This decision was based on the traditional incidence test; however, the court demonstrated an awareness of the
problems which could be created by international terrorism by
stating:
We have enough of our own domestic criminal violence with which to contend without importing and harboring with open arms the worst that other
countries have to export. We recognize the validity and usefulness of the
political offense exception, but it should be applied with great care lest our
country become a social jungle and an encouragement to terrorists
everywhere.14

The court also noted, referring to Ornelas v. Ruiz,14 that the civilian status of the victims was a significant consideration in deciding
145
whether the political offense exception should apply.
Another significant aspect of the Eain case was that the government argued that the political branches of the government should
have sole discretion to determine whether a crime was a political
offense. 4 6 This argument was rejected as having no basis in light of
a long line of American case law in which the judiciary had determined whether an offense was political.1 4 7 To the contrary, the
court reaffirmed that the judiciary was charged with this decision,
stating that the reviewing magistrate must make two basic determinations before an act may be determined to be a political offense. 4 8 First, the magistrate must determine if there was a violent
political disturbance in the requesting country; and second,
whether the acts charged against the person sought for extradition
were incidental to the disturbance. 49 The accused in Eain failed to
141.

Id.

142. Id. at 520.
143.

Id.

144. 161 U.S. 502 (1896). See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
145. 641 F.2d 504, 523 (7th Cir. 1981).
146. Id. at 513.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at 515.
Id. at 516. Note, however, the language in Eain indicating that the Secretary of

State can engage in forum shopping for another magistrate if the reviewing magistrate determines that a crime for which extradition is sought is a political offense:
On the other hand, if the magistrate concludes that the individual is not extraditable, it is up to the Secretary of State to decide whether or not to pursue the issue

1987

Political Offense Exception

meet the requirements of the second determination because the
bombing in question was found not to be incidental to the political
disturbance in Israel. 150 In fact, the court stated that a bombing
that was intended to kill civilians may not be considered incidental
to the purpose of toppling a government."' 1 The court further
hinted that for an act to be incidental to such a purpose there
would have to be a "direct link between the perpetrator, a political
1' 52
organization's political goals, and the specific act.
The incidence test has also been consistently applied to cases
involving extradition requests from Great Britain for the extradition of members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). For example,
in In re McMullen,15 3 an extradition magistrate denied Great Britain's request for extradition of an IRA member who had been involved in the bombing of a military barracks in England. 1 54 The
magistrate, applying the incidence test, found that this act took
place during an uprising that existed throughout the United Kingdom and was incidental to that political uprising.15 5 The same result was reached in Matter of Mackin, 56 where a magistrate held
that an IRA member accused of shooting a British soldier in Belfast, Northern Ireland, should not be extradited to Great Britain
on the ground that he had committed a political offense.157 The
United States appealed this decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, and alternatively sought a writ of
mandamus to force the magistrate to grant the extradition rebefore another magistrate,....The Secretary, it appears, contrary to general practice, has been permitted to shop for a more receptive magistrate.
Id. (citation omitted).
150. Id. at 520.
151. Id. at 521.
152. Id. The court in Eain further stated that:
Rather, the indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace is not recognized as a
protected political act even when the larger 'political' objective of the person who sets
off the bomb may be to eliminate the civilian population of a country. Otherwise,
isolated acts of social violence undertaken for personal reasons would be protected
simply because they occurred during a time of political upheaval, a result we think
the political offense exception was not meant to produce.
Id.
153. For a discussion of this case see Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 801 (9th Cir.
1986).
154. Id.
155. Id. The magistrate in the McMullen case found that the political offense exception applied despite a personal dislike for the results, noting that "[e]ven though the offense
be deplorable and heinous, the criminal actor will be excluded from the deportation if the
crime is committed under these pre-requisites." Id.
156. 668 F.2d 122 (2nd Cir. 1981).
157. Id.

502

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 25:481

quest. 158 The court of appeals held that the magistrate's decision
to deny the extradition was unappealable' 59 and that the magistrate did not exceed her jurisdiction in determining that the political offense exception applied. 6 0
Another case dealing with an extradition request aimed at an
IRA member is In re Doherty,6 in which the ambush killing of a
British army captain in Belfast, Northern Ireland, was held to be a
political act and, thus, a non-extraditable offense.' 6 2 The United
States district court in Doherty carefully analyzed the political offense exception in reaching its conclusion. First, it concluded that
the exception was not limited to actual armed insurrections and
more traditional types of hostilities, but could apply to guerilla activity as well."63 The court then turned its attention to the violent
aspect of the offense, concluding that violence in itself did not preclude the applicability of the political offense exception.'" To this
end, it was noted that civilians were not a target of the attack in
question nor was the attack committed in a place other than the
situs of the political disturbance. 65 The court further concluded
that it was required to "assess the nature of the act, the context in
which it is committed, the status of the party committing the act,
the nature of the organization on whose behalf it is committed, and
the particularized circumstances of the place where the act takes
place."' 66 Even in concluding that extradition in the Doherty case
should be denied, the court showed concern over the possibility
that terrorists could routinely come under the political offense exception. s7 The court therefore distinguished the IRA from other
more amorphous terrorist groups by taking into account its organization, internal discipline and command structure.'18 In essence,
158. Id. at 123-25.
159. Id. at 125-30.
160. Id. at 130-37.
161. Id.
162. 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
163. Id. at 275.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 275-76.
166. Id. at 275.
167. Id. at 276.
168. Id. Specifically the district judge stated:
The court is not unmindful of the fact that it would be most unwise as a matter of
policy to extend the benefit of the political offense exception to every fanatic group or
individual with loosely defined political objectives who commit acts of violence in the
name of those so called political objectives. Therefore it is proper for the court to
consider the nature of an organization, its structure, and its mode of internal discipline, in deciding whether the act of its members can constitute political conduct
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this examination of the organization and structure of the IRA was
designed to ensure that the offense was directly related to the political objectives of the group.6 9 Up until and immediately following the decision in Doherty no members of the IRA had ever been
170
returned following an extradition request from Great Britain.
Finally, in Quinn v. Robinson,17 ' a decision was handed down in
which a member of the IRA was extradited from the United States
to Great Britain.17 1 In Quinn, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit faced an appeal by the United States from a
district court's decision that the involvement in several London
bombings by a member of the IRA was a political offense. 7 3 Originally, a magistrate had found that extradition would be proper in
the case; however, after reviewing the accused's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, the district court found that the political offense
exception was applicable.' 7 4 On review, the court of appeals held,
applying the traditional American incidence approach, that the offenses charged did not fall within the parameters of the political
offense exception and thus extradition should be granted.17 5 Although the court was able to find that a political uprising existed
in Northern Ireland at the time the offenses charged were commit76
ted, it further found that no such uprising existed in England.
Thus, the court concluded that "[t]he crimes did not take place
within a territorial entity in which a group of nationals were seekunder an appropriate interpretation of the Treaty.
Id.
169. Id.
170. Gilbert, Terrorism and the PoliticalOffense Exemption Reappraised,34 INr'L &
COMP. L. Q. 695, 699 (1985).
171. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 785-86.
175. Id. at 817-18. The court in Quinn v. Robinson described the incidence test as
applied as such:
The incidence test has two components, designed so that the exception comports with
its original justifications and protects acts of the kind that inspired its inclusion in
extradition treaties. First, there must be an uprising-a political disturbance related
to the struggle of individuals to alter or abolish the existing government in their
country. An uprising is both temporally and spatially limited. Second, the charged
offense must be related to the political struggle or be consequent to the uprising activity. Neither the objectives of the uprising nor the means employed to achieve these
objectives are the subject of judicial scrutiny. And while the nature of the uprising
group and any evidence of the accused's motivations may be relevant, proof of these
elements is not required or necessarily determinative.
Id. at 817.
176. Id. at 813.
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ing to change the form of government under which they 1live,"
and,
77
therefore, the political offense exception did not apply.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Quinn v. Robinson is that
it strongly reaffirmed a belief on the part of the judiciary that the
incidence test works in light of the purposes and objectives of the
political offense exception. 178 The purposes of the exception, as
identified by the Quinn court, are: (1) to recognize that individuals
have the right to resort to political activism in helping to bring
about political change; (2) to prevent unsuccessful rebels from being returned to countries where they would receive unfair trials
and punishment because of their political opinions; and (3) to allow a government to avoid intervening in the internal political
struggles of another nation.7 9 The Quinn court's reaffirmance of
the incidence test comes in the face of much criticism of the approach. 180 Much of this criticism is fueled by the recent increases
in acts of international terrorism. In response to these terrorist
acts, there have been legislative proposals which would statutorily
limit the acts which could be found to be political offenses. These
legislative proposals will be examined in the following section of
this comment. The Quinn court, however, has reached the conclusion that the incidence test, when properly applied, can deal with
the perceived problem that is created by terrorist activity. In fact,
the Quinn court concluded that a proper interpretation of the political offense exception would exclude acts of international terrorism from its scope.' 8' Specifically, as a part of its conclusion, the
court stated that "[a]cts of international terrorism do not meet the
incidence test and are thus not covered by the political offense
82
exception."1
IV.

LEGISLATIVE AND EXEcUTIVE REFORM

There have been several attempts within the last five years to
177. Id. at 814. Here the court stated:
In light of the justifications for the political offense exception, the formulation of the
incidence test as it has traditionally been applied, we do not believe it would be
proper to stretch the term 'uprising' to include acts that took place in England as a
part of a struggle by nationals of Northern Ireland to change the form of government
in their own land.

Id.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at
Id. at
For a
Id. at
Id. at

801.
793.
summary of this criticism see id. at 797-801.
808.
817.
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limit the availability of the political offense exception in the
United States courts."'3 This section will examine two of those attempts: first, the proposed amendments to the United States
Code,18 4 and second, the proposed United States-United Kingdom
Supplementary Extradition Treaty. 85
A.

Current Extradition Law

The United States Code governs extraditions "of persons who
have committed crimes in foreign countries,"' 186 only when the two
involved states are parties to an extradition treaty. 8 7 When a
treaty provides for extradition, the process is begun by the requesting state, which files a complaint under oath charging the
person with any crime provided for by the treaty.1 88 The magistrate then issues a warrant for the person's apprehension so that
"he may be brought before . . . [the] magistrate."'8 9 A hearing is
then held, the purpose of which "is to consider evidence constituting probable cause to believe that the accused in fact committed
an extraditable crime under the treaty."' 90
If, after the hearing, the magistrate determines that the evidence
presented is sufficient to sustain the charge, he must certify the
accused to the Secretary of State for surrender.' 9 ' Once certified to
the Secretary of State, the executive branch has discretion as to
whether the accused will be surrendered and may refuse the request.'9 2 "The executive [branch] can decline the extradition request for a person claiming political offender status even though
the court found the exception inapplicable. However, the executive
cannot surrender a fugitive found by the court to meet the political
offender test."' 9 3 Thus, under current law, the responsibility for
183. Comment, Eliminating the Political Offense Exception for Violent Crimes: The
Proposed United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 26 VA. J.
INT'L L. 755, 756 n.9 (1986).
184. 18 U.S.C. §§3181-3195 (1982).
185. S. Doc. No. 8, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985).
186. 18 U.S.C. §3181 (1982).
187. Id.
188. 18 U.S.C. §3184 (1982). The complaint is filed in the jurisdiction where the person can be found. Id.
189. Id.
190. Comment, Extradition Reform and the Statutory Definition of Political Offenses, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 419, 438 n. 123 (1984).
191. 18 U.S.C. §3184 (1982). The magistrate also certifies a copy of the testimony
heard to the Secretary of State. Id.
192. 18 U.S.C. §3186 (1982).
193. Comment, supra note 190, at 438 (citations omitted).
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determining the application of the political offense doctrine is di194
vided between the judiciary and the executive branch.
B.

Proposed Changes in the Senate

On September 18, 1981, Senator Thurmond introduced S.1639 in
the Senate1 9 5 to modernize federal practices and procedures regarding international extradition.198 On consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee, changes were suggested to the original
bill, 197 and so on December 11, 1981, Senator Thurmond introduced to the Senate a clean bill, S.1940,195 which incorporated
those changes.
S.1940 limited the purpose of the initial judicial hearing for determining whether to grant extradition.' 9 9 The bill would strip
from the courts jurisdiction to determine the merits of the
charge.2 0 0 Therefore:
[t]he evidence heard would relate only to 1) a finding of probable cause to
believe that the person arrested is the person charged, 2) a finding that the
foreign state has evidence to substantiate its complaint, and 3) a finding
20 1
that the act complained of is an offense punishable under U.S. law.

The bill provides that if the court found the person extraditable, it
would order the person held in official detention 20 2 until either the
person was surrendered to the requesting state or until the Secretary of State declined the request.203 The bill also made this inquiry the only permissible inquiry, except for an appeal. 0 4 Under
S.1940, any appeal would be limited to reviewing the magistrate's
194. The commentators are split on the effectiveness of this method. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 171, at 439-40 (the method provides the accused with an important safeguard in that the decisions of the extradition magistrate are reviewed by the State Department thus providing for a dual shield). But see, e.g., Extradition Act of 1981: Hearing on
S.1639 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. 2 (1981) (statement of
Daniel McGovern, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State) (because the applicability of
the political offense doctrine is decided by the executive branch in some cases and by the
judiciary in others, there is a likelihood of inconsistent results).
195. Reprinted in Extradition Act of 1981: Hearing on S.1639 Before the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 297 (1982).
196. S. Rep. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. 1 (1982).
197. S. Rep. No. 331, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. 3 (1982).
198. Reprinted in Extradition Act of 1981: Hearing on S.1639 Before the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1982).
199. S. 1940, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. §3194(a).
200. Id.
201. Comment, supra note 190, at 441, and S.1940, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §3194(d).
202. S. 1940, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §3194(e).
203. Id.
204. Id.
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findings of the initial hearing.20 5 Under S.1940, therefore, the only
way to invoke the protection of the political offense exception was
for the accused person to persuade the Secretary of State, by written evidence and argument, that the exception was applicable. 0 6
The proposed legislation raised serious questions regarding the
appropriate method of reforming the extradition law.20 7 Nevertheless, at the request of Senator Percy, the Senate Judiciary Committee referred the bill sequentially to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 0 8 That committee proposed amendments to the
bill that would allow the courts to retain jurisdiction over the applicability of the political offense exception. 09 However, the committee was "very clear that in order to effect more consistent application of the exception, the courts must be given clearer
of behavior that should
guidelines with respect to certain classes
' 2 10
never be considered political offenses.
As a result, the committee proposed amendments that would exclude certain kinds of conduct from the political offense exception
by providing a statutory list of crimes which the courts were precluded from considering to be political offenses.2 1' The full Senate
passed the version favored by the Foreign Relations Committee in
August, 1982.212 The 97th Congress, however, failed to take further
action. This legislation was then reintroduced in the Senate, when
the 98th Congress convened, as S.220, on January 25, 1983.213
S.220, while returning jurisdiction over the applicability of the
205. Id. at § 3195. Since the applicability of the political offense exception would not
be decided by the State Department until after the initial hearing before the magistrate, the
accused could not appeal the Secretary of State's decision. S.1940, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §
3194(e).
206. S.1940, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3196(a)(3).
207. Comment, supra note 190, at 442-446. These included the constitutionality of the
legislation and the assumption that by removing jurisdiction from the courts foreign policy
objectives would be facilitated. Id.
208. S. Rep. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982).
209. "While it can be argued that the Secretary of State is generally better able than
the courts to assess the circumstances justifying a political offense exception, the Committee
favors the retention of some role for the judicial process." S. Rep. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1982).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 19-20. The committee's intention was to "deter international terrorists...
from using the United States as a safehaven from prosecution." S. Rep. No. 475, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 7-8 (1982).
212. See 128 CONG. REc. S. 10,880 (August 19, 1982). However, the Congressional Record mistakenly published contradictory provisions regarding which branch of the government retained the jurisdiction to decide the applicability of the political offense exception.
See Comment, supra note 190, at 419-20.
213. Comment, supra note 190, at 420.
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political offense exception to the judiciary, 1 ' still places the burden on the accused to show that the exception is applicable.2 15 It
also delineates a number of crimes that are not offenses of a political character including an offense that consists of rape.21 It further provides that "except in extraordinary circumstances," a political offense does not encompass:
(A) an offense that consists of homicide, assault with intent to commit serious bodily injury, kidnapping, the taking of a hostage, or a serious unlawful
detention;
(B) an offense involving the use of a firearm . . .if such use endangers a
person other than the offender;
(C) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in Subparaa
graphs [9] or [10] of this paragraph, or participation as an accomplice of
2 17
person who commits, attempts, or conspires to commit such an offense.

Similarly then, S.220 restricts the availability of the political offense exception as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee suggested.2 18 "Acts of indiscriminate or excessive violence or acts of
deliberate brutality would presumably never fall within the excep214. The bill states that a court shall not make a finding that the accused is extraditable if he establishes by evidence that is clear and convincing that he is sought for an offense
that is of a political character. S.220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3194(e) (1984).
215. Id.
216. S.220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §3194(1)(F) (1984). More completely the list includes:
(A) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on December 16, 1970;
(B) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on September 23, 1971;
(C) a serious offense involving an attack against the life, physical integrity, or liberty
of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents;
(D) an offense with respect to which a multilateral treaty obligates the United States
to either extradite or prosecute a person accused of the offense;
(E) an offense that consists of the manufacture, importation, distribution, or sale of
narcotics or dangerous drugs; ...
(G) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in subparagraphs (A)
and (F) of this paragraph, or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits,
attempts, or conspires to commit such an offense.
Id. § 3194(1)(A)-(G).
217. Id. § 3194(2)(A)-(C).
218. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated:
The Committee intends that the burden of the person resisting extradition in demonstrating such extraordinary circumstances should be a considerable one . . .[I]t is
not intended, for example, that the mere existence of a rebellion, civil war, riot or
other disturbance, during which the offense in question is committed, should result in
a finding that the offense itself is political in nature. Nor should it be sufficient simply to show that the motivation of the individual committing the act-however sincere or noble-was related to a political objective.
S. Rep. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982).
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tion. '219 The bill also excludes conduct which, under current law,
would readily receive protection under the exception.2 2 However
this is only one problem. The bill's more compelling burden of
proof required of the accused coupled with the "extraordinary circumstances" requirement makes the judiciary's discretion very
narrow. 21 One commentator suggests that this may eventually
emasculate the exception.2 2 2
Eliminating certain crimes involving homicide, grievous assault
and deliberate brutality may be a viable solution to recent terroristic activities. However, at the same time, it may create an automatic duty to extradite anyone who used violent means in pursuit
of a cause. Conceivably then, extradition would include, in addition to brutal dictators like Adolph Hitler, Idi Amin or the Ayatollah Khomeni, the likes of George Washington and Lech Walesa. 22 3
In addition, since the discretion of the courts is limited, only the
State Department can protect fugitives who, arguably, should be
protected from extradition.2 24 While in one respect this is admirable, since the executive branch can implement its own foreign policy, it raises inquiry as to which branch, the executive or the judicial, is substantively defining the political offense exception. If the
task is left to the executive branch, impartial public tribunals, required by current law, 225 will be a thing of the past.
C. Proposed Changes in the House
During the same period that the Senate was considering proposed changes to current law, the House considered another draft.
On December 15, 1981, the first House Bill, H.R.5227 was introduced by William J. Hughes, as a result of months of work by the
members of the Subcommittee on Crime.2 26 The impetus for this
legislation was the awareness of a need for reform in an area of the
219. Id.
220. Comment, supra note 190, at 448.
221. Id. at 449.
222. Id.
223. Extradition Reform Act of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 5227 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 204
(1982)(statement of Christopher Pyle, Associate Professor, Mount Holyoke College).
224. Supra note 209.
225. 18 U.S.C. § 3189 (1982)("Hearings in cases of extradition under treaty stipulation
or convention shall be held on land, publicly, and in a room or office easily accessible to the
public.").
226. H.R. Rep. No. 627, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1 at 2 (1982). The concern was that
current law was not sufficient to meet transnational crime challenges. Id. at 3.
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law last subjected to major legislative action in 1882,227 and a request for legislation by the then-present Administration. 22
H.R.5227 incorporated many of the suggestions of the Administration also found in S.1940.229 It attempted to resolve major
problems including, inter alia, the question of what is and what is

not a "political offense. "230
H.R.5227 gave jurisdiction to the courts to decide the applicability of the political offense exception.2 3 It too, like S.220, delineated a number of crimes that are not includable under the heading
of political offense.23 2 After H.R.5227 was introduced, the Subcommittee on Crime held hearings that lasted two days.2 33 It concluded
that certain changes in the bill were desirable. 2 4 The subcommittee met on March 24, 1982, and "approved an amendment in the
nature of a substitute that incorporated a large number of
changes. ' 23 5 This resulted in a clean bill, H.R.6046, being
227. H.R. Rep. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984).
228. H.R. Rep. No. 627, supra note 226, at 3.
229. Id. See also Congressional Record, December 15, 1981, at E5877. Among the suggestions were that the Attorney General act as the complainant, that an arrest warrant be
permitted to issue when the fugitive's location was not known and that the right to counsel
be established. Id.
230. H.R. Rep. No. 627, supra note 226, at 2.
231. H.R. 5227, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3194(e)(1)(B)(2) (1982).
232. Id. at § 3194(e)(2)(B)(i)-(viii). This section provedes:
(B) A political offense normally does not include(i) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague of December 16, 1970;
(ii) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on September 23, 1971;
(iii) a serious offense involving an attack against the life, physical integrity, or liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents;
(iv) an offense with respect to which a treaty obligates the United States to either
extradite or prosecute a person accused of the offense;
(v) an offense that consists of homicide, assault with intent to commit serious bodily injury, rape, kidnapping, the taking of a hostage, or serious unlawful detention;
(vi) an offense involving the use of a firearm if such use endangers a person other
than the offender;
(vii) an offense that consists of the manufacture, importation, distribution, or sale
of narcotics or dangerous drugs;
(viii) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in clauses (i)
through (vii) of this subparagraph, or participation as an accomplice of a person who
commits, attempts, or conspires to commit such an offense.
233. H.R. Rep. No. 627, supra note 226, at 4.
234. Id.
235. Id. One change was that the burden of proving the application of the political
offense exception, placed on the person sought for extradition, was by a preponderance of
the evidence. Id.
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introduced. 3 a
The House Judiciary Committee reported favorably on the clean
bill on May 18, 1982. However, "because of both the press of legislative business during the post-election session and certain controversies over its substance, the Bill was not considered on the floor
' 23 7
of the House.
Thereafter, during the 98th Congress, H.R. 2643238 was introduced. 239 The Subcommittee on Crime again held two days of hearings and again decided upon changes.2 "0 As a result of the changes,
H.R. 3347241 was introduced.2 42 The pertinent part of that bill
states:
(2) For the purposes of this section, a political offense does not include(A) a serious offense involving an attack against the life, physical integrity,
or liberty of internationally protected persons . .. , including diplomatic
agents;
(B) an offense with respect to which a multilateral treaty obligates the
United States to either extradite or submit for prosecution a person accused
of the offense;
(C) an offense that consists of the manufacture, importation, distribution,
or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs;
(D) forcible sexual assault; or
(E) an offense that consists of intentional, direct participation in a wanton
or indiscriminate act of violence with extreme indifference to the risk of
causing death or serious bodily injury to persons not taking part in armed
4
2

hostilities[.]

3

236. H.R. 6046, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
237. H.R. Rep. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
238. H.R. 2643, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
239. H.R. Rep. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The bill was introduced as The
Extradition Act of 1983 by William J. Hughes & Harold S. Sawyer on April 20, 1983.
240. Id. H.R. 5227 § 3194(e)(2)(B) stated:
A political offense normally does not include-.
(v) an offen3e that consists of homicide, assault with intent to commit serious bodily injury, rape, kidnapping, the taking of a hostage, or serious unlawful detention;
(vi) an offense involving the use of a firearm . . .if such use endangers a person
other than the offender[.]
H.R.2643 §3194(e)(3) stated:
For the purposes of this section, a political offense, except in extraordinary circumstances, does not include(A) an offense that consists of homicide, assault with intent to commit serious bodily injury, kidnapping, the taking of a hostage, or a serious unlawful detention;
(B) an offense involving the use of a firearm . . .if such use endangers a person
other than the offender;
(C) rape[.]
241. H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
242. The bill was introduced by Messrs. Hughes, Sawyer, Ferghan, Smith and Sesenbrenner on June 16, 1983.
243. H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §3194(e)(2)(A)-(E) (1983).
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Thus, by comparison, H.R. 3347 is less restrictive than its counterpart S. 220. The House bill does not exclude the protections of the
political offense exception to every homicide case or every crime
involving the use of a firearm. 44 Arguably then, a figure such as
George Washington would still receive the protections afforded by
the political offense exception.2 4 5 At the same time, it does not offer protection to terrorist activities since, under the bill, a political
offense does not include an offense that consists of wanton or indiscriminate acts of violence.2 46
The respective burdens of proof between the Senate and House
bills are also inharmonious. S. 220 requires that if the court determines that the accused has established by clear and convincing evidence that the offense for which he may be subject to prosecution
if extradited is a political offense, then he shall not be considered
extraditable.2 4 7 In contrast, the House bill requires only a preponderance of the evidence.2 48 However, since the House bill declares
terrorist activities extraditable, 4 9 the lower standard still makes it
likely that no terrorist can invoke the exception's protections for
pure terrorist activities.
A noteworthy addition to the House bill, not contained in the
Senate bill, is a clause which states that "[t]he inclusion . . . of
certain offenses [which are not political offenses] does not preclude
the exclusion of other offenses from the political offense category."2 50 It then provides a list for the court to consider, as of the
time of the offense, in determining whether an offense is a political
2 51
offense:
(A) the status (whether civilian, governmental, or military) of any victims of
the alleged offense;
(B) the relationship of the alleged offender to a political organization;
(C) the existence of a civil uprising, rebellion, widespread civil unrest, or
insurrection within the State requesting extradition;
(D) the motive of the alleged offender for the conduct alleged to constitute
the offense;
(E) the nexus of such alleged conduct to the goals of a political organization;
244. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
246. H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3194(e)(2)(E) (1983).
247. S.220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §3194(e) (1983).
248. H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §3194(d)(2)(C) (1983).
249. H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §3194(e)(2)(E) (1983). This describes terrorist
activities as "wanton or indiscriminate act[s] of violence" done with extreme indifference to
the risk of citizens.
250. H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. §3194(e)(3) (1983).
251. Id.
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and
(F) the seriousness of the offense.252

This list incorporates ideas used by other countries that require
the government to be the butt of the crime.2 53 In addition, it recognizes an inherent right to rebel and in doing so protects acts of
political protest recognized by law, while denying terrorists the
protections from extradition.
On October 4, 1983, the House Judiciary Committee approved
this bill by a voice vote.2 54 Unfortunately, the bill was rejected by
the House "when it failed to draw the necessary two-thirds majority under suspension of the House Rules."2 55
Both the Senate and former House bills are in agreement that
the determination of political offender status is a matter initially
for the judicial branch, in contravention to the earlier proposed
legislation that attempted to grant jurisdiction of the question to
the executive branch.25 6 H.R. 3347 attempted to go further in that
the court would have actually decided the substantive merit of the
alleged offenders' claims. 5 7 Under S. 220, the court may become
obligated to honor all extradition requests. 2 8 Thus H.R. 3347 represented a better solution in preserving the judicial authority used
since the "first bilateral agreement the United States entered into

after its independence. "259
D.

The Proposed United States-United Kingdom
Supplementary Extradition Treaty

On June 25, 1985, the United States and the United Kingdom
amended their current extradition treaty2 6 by executing a Supplementary Extradition Treaty. 26 1 It represented "a significant step to
improve law enforcement cooperation and counter the threat of in252. H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §3194(e)(3)(A)-(F) (1983).
253. The ideas incorporated are those of the Swiss, see supra, notes 24-55 and accompanying text, the objective test of the French, see supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text,
and the Castioni test used by the English, see supra notes 75-111 and accompanying text.
254. S. Exec. Rep. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Seass. 4 (1986).
255. Id. See also 130 CONG. Rac. H9442 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1983).
256. Supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
257. Comment, supra note 190, at 457.
258. Id.
259. H.R. Rep. No. 627, supra note 226, at 1, 2.
260. Treaty of Extradition, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T.
227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
261. S. Treaty Doc. No. 8, 99th Cong., 1st Seass. 1 (1985).
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ternational terrorism and other crimes of violence,"2 62 by "excluding from the scope of the political offense exception serious offenses typically committed by terrorists."26" By mandating that
certain crimes are no longer political offenses,26 4 the proposed Supplementary Treaty limits the judicial discretion to determine
whether the offense committed by the accused is of a political
26
nature. 5
On July 17, 1985, after the President transmitted the Supplementary Treaty to the Senate and the injunction of secrecy was
262. Transmittal letter of George P. Schultz, Secretary of State, 131 CONG. REc.
S.9748 (daily ed. July 18, 1985).
263. 131 CONG. REC. S.9696 (daily ed. July 17, 1985), Transmittal letter of President
Ronald Reagan, 131 CONG. REC. S.9696 (daily ed. July 17, 1985). Examples given of offenses
typically committed by terrorists are: "aircraft hijacking and sabotage, crimes against diplomats, hostage taking, and other heinous acts such as murder, manslaughter, malicious assault, and certain serious offenses involving firearms, explosives and damage to property."
Id.
264. See supra note 261.
265. Article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty excepts the following offenses from being
characterized as political:
(a) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature at The Hague on 16 December 1970;
(b) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Montreal on 23
September 1971;
(c) an offense within the scope of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment
of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents,
opened for signature at New York on 14 December 1973;
(d) an offense within the scope of the International Convention against the Taking of
Hostages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979;
(e) murder;
(f) manslaughter;
(g) maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm;
(h) kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment or unlawful detention, including the
taking of a hostage;
(i) the following offenses relating to explosives:
(1) the causing of an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious damage to
property; or
(2) conspiracy to cause such an explosion; or
(3) the making or possession of an explosive substance by a person who intends
either himself or through another person to endanger life or cause serious damage to
property;
() the following offenses relating to firearms or ammunition:
(1) the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who intends either himself or through another person to endanger life; or
(2) the use of a firearm by a person with intent to resist or prevent the arrest or
detention of himself or another person;
(k) damaging property with intent to endanger life or with reckless disregard as to
whether the life of another would thereby be endangered;
(1) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
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removed, the Supplementary Treaty was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. 2 " There were three days of hearings in
which twenty witnesses gave oral testimony and numerous written
analyses were received for the record. 0 7 It was stated, as background material, that "[t]he Supplementary Treaty as submitted
would, for all intents and purposes, have eliminated the political
exception for acts of violence and with it the traditional role of
U.S. courts to deny extradition in connection with alleged political
offenses. '26 Because of this feeling, the committee found it necessary to make compromises and amendments.
The primary focus of the committee was the political offense exception.2 " Article 1 of the Treaty as submitted excluded all serious
violent crimes from being considered as political offenses.
Accordingly individuals sought for extradition to the United Kingdom
would have no longer been able to interpose a defense based on political
considerations at their extradition hearing. Their only recourse would have
been to appeal to the Secretary of State to exercise his
discretion to deny
27
the extradition request notwithstanding a court ruling. 1

The arguments for this type of process were twofold; first, there
was a feeling that "violence should never be deemed an acceptable
part of the political process. ' 27 1 Second, a refusal "to extradite
even a few terrorists undermines U.S. antiterrorism policy . . .
bottomed on the proposition that cooperation with our democratic
allies is an essential element in the war against international
27' 2
terrorism.
As a counterbalance to these considerations was the concern that
the changes in the political offense exception would bring about a
change in precedent that may have been unwarranted.7 3
The fear was expressed that in the rush to deal with the problem of the
moment, international terrorism, a valued American tradition, the right of
political sanctuary, would be lost. Furthermore, taking the political offense
exception away from the courts left the executive branch with the sole discretion to determine whether to extradite when political issues were involved. Individual justice might be sacrificed to broader foreign policy
266. 131 CONG. REc. S.9696 (daily ed. July 17, 1985).
267. S. Exec. Rep. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986).
268. Id.
269. 132 CONG. REc. S.9147 (daily ed. July 16, 1986)(statement of Sen. Lugar).
270. Id.
271. Id. Senator Lugar argued that "[w]here the individual can bring about political
change through the ballot box, the bomb and the bullet have no place." Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at S.9148.
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issues.

To appease these conflicting terms, a compromise resolution of
ratification was sponsored by Senators Eagletan and Lugar. 27 Basically, what is now Article 1 is a restricted list of offenses that a
court may not consider to be political offenses.2 70 Article 3 gives
jurisdiction to the courts to refuse extradition when it is apparent
that the "request is a pretext or when the individual would be subject to political or religious persecution. 2 77 The person sought
would also be given the opportunity of proving, by the preponderance of the evidence, that he was sought because of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions.278
Another major change included a restatement of the procedures
2 79
that govern extradition requests filed in United States courts.
The compromise resolution "reaffirms that the magistrate . . is to
permit the individual to present evidence in connection with the
request [and] insures that no individual is to be extradited without
a fair hearing. ' 28 0 Also, the committee recommended a declaration
stating that the "Senate will not approve treaties with totalitarian
or nondemocratic regimes and that neither the Supplementary
Treaty nor any particular provision of it is to be considered a precedent for the treaties. '281 In other words, each attempt to supplement any treaty would be subject to an in depth review of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Finally, the committee reviewed
the issue of retroactivity and maintained it. They provided that
the treaty will apply to offenses committed before the effective
274. Id. These concerns mirrored those associated with early congressional legislation.
See, e.g., notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
275. 132 CONG. REC. S.9148 (daily ed. July 16, 1986)(statement of Sen. Lugar). Senator
Lugar stated that "[tihis resolution takes the unusual, although not unprecedented, step of
making senate consent to ratification conditioned on the acceptance by the Government of
the United Kingdom and the executive branch of the United States of amendments to the
text of the treaty." Id.
276. Id. "In effect, those who commit serious acts of violence, or attempt to commit, or
participate as an accomplice in these acts, can no longer escape extradition by claiming their
offenses were political." Id. However, acts involving possession of firearms and conspiracy
offenses were deleted. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. Article 2 was a distillation of settled United States law regarding probable
cause and any appropriate affirmative defenses.
280. Id. "It is designed to lay to rest any assumption that extradition under this Supplementary Treaty will be 'automatic' or that federal magistrates and judges will not carefully evaluate the evidence presented in support of extradition." S. Exec. Rep. 17, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 5 (1986).
281. 132 CONG. REc. S.9148 (daily ed. July 16, 1986)(statement of Sen. Lugar).

1987

Political Offense Exception

date of the treaty. "2
On July 17, 1986, the Senate voted to accept the resolution of
ratification to the Supplementary Treaty. In pertinent part the final Supplementary Treaty provides:
Article 1
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following shall be
regarded as an offense of a political character:
(a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the obligation pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the person sought
or to submit his case to the competent authorities for decision as to
prosecution;
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily
harm;
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a
hostage;
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or
parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this endangers any person;
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation as
an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an
offense.

Article 3
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty, extradition shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction
of the competent judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that
the request for extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or
that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trail [sic] or punished,
detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion,
nationality or political opinions.
(b) In the United States, the competent judicial authority shall only consider the defense to extradition set forth in paragraph (a) for defenses listed
in Article 1 of this Supplementary Treaty. A finding under paragraph (a)
shall be immediately appealable by either party to the United States district court, or court of appeals, as appropriate. The appeal shall receive expedited consideration at every stage. The time for filing a notice of appeal
shall be 30 days from the date of the filing of the decision. In all other
respects, the applicable provisions of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or Civil Procedure, as appropriate, shall govern the appeals process.
282. Sen. Exec. Rep. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986). They reasoned that murder has
always been murder and therefore the Supplemental Treaty did not criminalize any conduct
that had not been criminal before. Id.
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Article 5
This Supplementary Treaty shall apply to any offense committed before or
after this Supplementary Treaty enters into force, provided that this Supplementary Treaty shall not apply to an offense committed before this Supplementary Treaty enters into force which was not an offense under the
laws of both Contracting Parties at the time of its commission.283

V.

CONCLUSION

Notwothstanding the view of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit that acts of international terrorism are not
protected by the political offense exception,2 84 it has been historically difficult to extradite members of the Irish Republican Army
(IRA). This alone was probably a silent impetus for the Supplementary Treaty. Similarly, ever increasing incidents of international terrorism have provided additional stimulus for both legislative and executive attempts at reform, although the attempts at
legislative reform have not been incorporated into the United
States Code.
At the outset, the Supplementary Treaty, which is the result of
executive reform, will aid the United States in extraditing members of the IRA accused of committing acts of violence.2 85 Moreover, members of the IRA "accused of committing certain violent
crimes can no longer be able to continue their opposition to British
rule from the United States. 282 The Supplementary Treaty represents a reaffirmation of the principle that a democratic government
with a fundamentally fair judicial system should be protected,
while at the same time recognizes the inherent right of a society to
alter a government no longer based on democratic principles. However, it remains to be seen whether this lofty tension will be served
by both the Supplementary Treaty and its application, in light of
the prior analysis used by the courts.
William G. Young
Frederick M. Erny

283.
284.
285.

Id. at 15 (Appendix I).
See notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
See notes 145-71 and accompanying text. In Quinn v. Robinson, supra note 171, a

petition for certiorari was filed by the defendant on July 2, 1986. Although the petition
seeks to overturn the finding of extraditability, the matter becomes moot with the treaty in
effect.
286. Comment, supra note 183, at 777.

